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Administrative Review and Oversight: 
The Experience of Westminster 
 
Mark Shephard 
 
Parliament has been left behind by far-reaching changes to the constitution, government and 
society in the past two decades. Despite recent innovations, particularly in the handling of 
legislation, the central question of Westminster's scrutiny of the executive has not been addressed. 
(Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, 2001: x) 
Prior to the Labour Party's election victory in 1997, Labour's manifesto promised an 'effective 
House of Commons' to be realised in large part through the creation of a special Select Committee with 
remit to review procedures in light of the 'need for modernisation'. Shortly after victory, Labour 
established a 'Modernisation Committee' chaired by the Leader of the Commons and with a remit to 
review four key areas: the legislative process; ministerial accountability; working practices (such as 
sitting hours); and the style and forms of proceedings. Between 1997 and 2003 the Committee 
published 19 reports starting with a report on the legislative process. However, to date, most 
of the reports have focused on the modernisation of working practices and the style and form of 
proceedings. Reports that deal with improving the effectiveness of ministerial accountability have 
been notably lacking. Consequently, the view of the Hansard Society that 'parliamentary reform 
has been one of improving the efficiency of Parliament, but not its effectiveness' appears just as 
valid three years on. 
 
There are of course serious contextual hurdles to reforming the effectiveness of Parliament. The 
nature of, and possibilities for administrative oversight at Westminster are largely bounded by 
constitutional arrangements such as the fusion of the executive and legislative branches in 
Parliament and the First-Past-the-Post electoral system that is conducive predominantly to one-
party majority government maintained through strong party discipline. Compounding the 
systemic strength of the executive in Parliament is the growth of careerism and an emphasis on 
the ministerial career ladder with rewards for partisan loyalty. In turn, Parliament is primarily 
considered as a body that reacts to executive measures82. This context of a strong executive and a 
reactive Parliament lacking independent powers and associated alternative career structures 
ultimately limits how far modernisation can go without 'seismic constitutional change'83. A prime 
example of the salience of context as a hurdle to the realisation of reform is the May 2002 defeat 
of the Modernisation Committee's proposal to move select committee appointment power from 
the party whips to a Committee of Nomination84. Alexandra Kelso argues that the context of 
partisan and patronage interests best explains why Parliament failed to make appointment to 
select committees a process independent of the whips' offices85. 
 
81 Hansard Society, The Challenge for Parliament: Making Government Accountable. Report of 
the 
Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, London, Hansard Society, 2001, p. 13. 
82 Philip Norton, Does Parliament Matter?, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993; Robert Rogers 
and Rhodri Walters, How Parliament Works (5th Edition), London, Pearson Longman, 2004. 
83 Robert Rogers and Rhodri Walters, How Parliament Works, cit., p. 369. 
84 Modernisation Select Committee, Select Committees, HC 224, 2001-2002 Session, 2002. 
85 Alexandra Kelso, "Where were the Massed ranks of Parliamentary Reformers? - 'Attitudinal' and 
'Contextual' 
Approaches to Parliamentary Reform", The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 9, n.1, 2003. 
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As well as context, the behaviour of parliamentarians can be a factor in determining the effectiveness of 
Parliament in executive oversight. Philip Norton stresses the importance of attitudinal and behavioral 
changes occurring alongside any institutional reforms86: “There is no point strengthening 
the House of Commons if MPs are unable or unwilling to exploit the opportunities afforded by 
such change”87. 
 
However, David Judge challenges the Norton view on the basis that the normative system of the 
House reflects the preferences of those with the most power and so attitudinal change and internal 
procedural reform will invariably fail unless key constitutional arrangements are addressed88. 
 
Oversight and Effectiveness in the Westminster Parliament 
The primary means of oversight in the Westminster Parliament are through debates, questions, and 
committees89. What follows is a discussion of key aspects of these means in the House of Commons 
as well as an attempt to assess their effectiveness. 
 
The salience of debates in the House of Commons as a means of oversight are constrained from the 
outset as the government controls not only the timetable but much of the ground on which it will 
debate90. However, even on its own ground, government does not dominate entirely. Rogers and 
Walters use the example of the 2003 government debate and vote on war with Iraq to illustrate the 
government's unprecedented decision to seek Parliament's approval for military action despite it 
being a prerogative power of the executive. As well as Parliament possibly having captured a prerogative 
power of the executive, Rogers and Walters argue that this decision has set a precedent 
that future governments may have to uphold if they wish to be seen as acting legitimately91. 
In addition, while the government may control the timetable, there are 20 Opposition Days (or 120 
hours) in which the opposition parties can debate and vote on a substantive motion of their choosing. 
Recent subjects chosen by the opposition have included advocating a referendum on the EU 
constitution and, questioning the military situation in Iraq, and the security of the electricity 
supply. 
Opposition Days provide a means for the opposition parties to scrutinise the actions and policies of 
the Government and selected subjects typically reflect domains where the opposition parties feel 
that the Government is particularly exposed to criticism. 
As to the effectiveness of Opposition Day debates, the evidence depends on whom you consult and 
what you measure. When the Hansard Society surveyed parliamentarians in June 2000, one of the 
questions they asked was 'How effective are Opposition Day debates in securing information and 
explanation from Government?'92. Of the 179 responses they received, less than one in four replied 
that they were effective. The Hansard Society Commission concluded that the predictable defeat of 
opposition motions during debates combined with the 'low quality of debate in general', the 'little 
 
86 Philip Norton, Parliament in the 1980s, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985; Philip Norton, Strengthening 
Parliament: 
The Report of the Commission to Strengthen Parliament, London, The Conservative Party, 2000. 
87 Philip Norton, Strengthening Parliament, op. cit., p. 21. 
88 David Judge, The Parliamentary State, London, Sage, 1993, p. 215. 
89 Philip Norton, Does Parliament Matter?, op. cit., p. 89. 
90 Hansard, The Challenge for Parliament, op. cit. 
91 Robert Rogers and Rhodri Walters, How Parliament Works, op. cit., p. 374. 
92 Hansard Society, The Challenge for Parliament, op. cit., p. 131-132. 
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public interest' and the usage of the procedure 'to identify which MPs deserve promotion' meant 
that 'debates may no longer be suitable for today's politics'93. 
However, the effectiveness of Opposition Days is hard to measure and the conclusions of the Hansard 
Society Commission may be a little harsh given the evidence. While opposition motions are 
routinely defeated, they can have indirect effects such as capturing and/or perpetuating media coverage 
and pressure on the Government. 
One such example was the October 2001 Opposition Day debate deploring spin tactics in the Department 
of Transport, Local Government and the Regions. The debate focused on the call for special 
adviser Jo Moore to resign over an email instructing colleagues to 'bury' bad news in the wake 
of the September 11th attacks. Jo Moore eventually resigned in February 2002 after constant media 
pressure and additional allegations of inappropriate behaviour. While the Opposition Day debate 
was not immediately or entirely instrumental in Moore's resignation, it is conceivable that it played 
some part. Another more recent example concerns the government's April 2004 u-turn over the 
possibility of holding a referendum on the EU constitution. 
As well as Opposition Days, there are half-hour adjournment debates, very occasional emergency 
adjournment debates, Early Day Motions and since 1999, parallel sittings in Westminster Hall for 
debates on less contentious business such as committee reports and adjournment debates. The halfhour 
adjournment debates occur at the end of each day and allow back-benchers to raise an issue 
with the government that typically reflects a specific constituency concern that an MP wants the 
relevant minister to respond to. Early Day Motions are rarely debated but are used by MPs to express 
opinions on subjects and provide governments with indicators of levels of back-bench support 
and opposition on issues. 
Arguably more important than debates, parliamentary questions (PQs) provide back-benchers an 
opportunity to call ministers to account. PQs include written questions and oral questions (departmental 
Question Time, inter-departmental Question Time, Prime Minister's Questions, Private Notice 
Questions, and questions following ministerial statements). 
Departmental Question Time lasts roughly an hour each Monday through Thursday while the Parliament 
is sitting. While the government decides the departmental rota for Question Time, on balance 
each department faces scrutiny from the Parliament approximately once every four weeks. 
Inter-departmental Question Time in the parallel chamber is a recent innovation (2003- ) that reflects 
attempts at 'joined-up' government for those issues such as crime that straddle departmental 
briefs. 
The format of Prime Minister's Questions changed under Tony Blair from twice-weekly question 
periods on Tuesdays and Thursdays to one 30-minute question period on Wednesdays. While the 
overall duration of PMQs remains the same, and although time-wasting introductions and reiteration 
of replies have been removed from the procedure under Blair, there is still some criticism of 
the change, particularly the loss of twice-weekly questioning. The Report of the Commission to 
Strengthen Parliament (aka the Norton Commission) favours a return to twice-weekly question periods 
on Tuesdays and Thursdays, each of 30 minutes. The rationale behind this recommendation is 
 
93 Hansard, ivi, pp. 50-51. 
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that it would help restore the importance of Thursdays as a major business day and that it would 
connect the PM more with the Parliament94. 
Private Notice Questions (PNQs) are questions of an urgent nature on key issues of national importance 
and are granted at the discretion of the Speaker. Once granted, ministers are given short notice 
to appear before Parliament and can be questioned as long as the Speaker permits. Unlike 
PNQs, statements by ministers are more common, are prompted by the executive, and provide the 
government with a chance to inform the House (pre-empting PNQs) on key issues that arise. However, 
statements by ministers are generally followed by questions, again at the discretion of the 
Speaker. 
Again, effectiveness of questions depends on whom you consult and what you measure. Out of the 
various types of questions, the Hansard Society found that just over half of MPs surveyed rated 
written questions as effective in securing information and explanation from government95. By 
comparison, oral questions were rated as less effective (effectiveness ranging from 45% for ministerial 
statements; 43% for Private Notice Questions; 25% for Question Time, to a low 8% for Prime 
Minister's Questions). 
One of the reasons why written questions are generally perceived as being more effective than oral 
questions is that whereas oral questions perform other legislative functions such as political point 
scoring and tension release, written questions permit a more focused and persistent means of oversight. 
As an example of this distinction, Walters and Rogers note how Labour MP Tam Dalyell's 
determined usage of written questions led to the uncovering of misinformation during the Falkland's 
conflict96. 
Of the oral questions, PNQs and ministerial statements are regularly singled out as procedures that 
the government should give more time to by curtailing other less effective procedures such as debates97. 
Responding primarily to a different recommendation in the Procedures Committee Report 
(2002), the government opted to reduce the period of notice for questions to ministers from ten to 
three sitting days arguing that this would encourage 'more topical and relevant' questioning98. The 
government rejected calls for extensions of departmental Question Time on a single subject due to 
time pressures. However, the government did consent to a once a week, hour-long session of questioning 
in Westminster Hall. 
Since the mid-1990s, the Public Administration Select Committee and its predecessor (Public Services 
Committee) have produced six reports on ministerial accountability and parliamentary questions. 
In their latest report, the Public Administration Select Committee continue to lament the evasive 
nature of many government replies to questions: "…the government's approach to answering 
 
94 Philip Norton, Strengthening Parliament, cit., p. 20-21. 
95 Hansard Society, The Challenge for Parliament, op. cit., p.131-132. 
96 Robert Rogers and Rhodri Walters, How Parliament, cit., p.303. 
97 Philip Norton, Strengthening Parliament, op. cit. ; Hansard Society, The Challenge for Parliament: 
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questions has, at times, been characterised as minimising the opportunity for scrutiny of its actions 
through careful and skilful crafting of answers."99 
The Committee acknowledges that the 1990s publication of codes of conduct, codes for access, and 
guidance on answering PQs have increased the duty on government to account for its actions. 
However, it criticises the government for treating public inquiries like the Hutton Inquiry more seriously 
('committed to co-operating fully') than either PQs or Select Committees ('information provided… 
as appropriate')100. 
Of particular concern to the Committee are the issues of quality of replies and unanswered questions 
(often due to either prohibitive costs, future promises of replies, or exemption in the Code of 
Access to Government Information). In response to the concerns, the government has agreed to answer 
'reasonable requests' about refusals to answer questions within 20 days, and has also agreed to 
specify the source of any exemption in its replies101. However, the Committee is sceptical about the 
government's level of commitment to its promises and has reacted by strengthening recommendations102. 
More important than either debates or questions are the oversight roles performed systematically by 
select committees since 1979. While acknowledging that the comparative effectiveness of the select 
committee system is constrained by the constitutional framework (primarily no separation of 
powers), single-party governments, and strong party loyalties, the Liaison Committee reported that 
the 'select committee system has been a success' and it has 'provided independent scrutiny of the 
government'103. Findings from the Hansard Society survey of MPs support this perspective as 84 
per cent rated select committee hearings as effective in securing information and explanation from 
government104. 
 
There are several types of select committee. First, departmental select committees shadow each 
government department and are responsible for the detailed oversight of government and public 
body expenditure, administration and policy. Second, inter-departmental select committees primarily 
oversee activities that cross-cut government departments, for example, the Environmental Audit 
Committee, the European Scrutiny Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, and the Public 
Administration Committee. Third are select committees that deal with the procedures and administration 
of the House, for example, the Liaison Committee (which largely comprises select committee 
chairs and considers matters relating to the work of select committees), the Procedures Committee 
and the Modernisation of the House of Commons Committee. 
Interest in reforming the select committee system has strengthened in recent years. Recommendations 
for reform have been wide-ranging (from increased resources to the establishment of independent 
appointment committees) and successes to date have been mixed. 
 
 
99 Public Administration Select Committee, Ministerial Accountability and Parliamentary Questions: The 
Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2001-2002, HC 136, 2002-2003 
Session, 
2002, p. 5. 
100 Public Administration Select Committee, ivi, p. 6. 
101 Public Administration Select Committee, ivi, p. 5. 
102 Public Administration Select Committee, ivi, p. 20. 
103 Liaison Committee, Shifting the Balance: Select Committees and the Executive, HC 300, 1999-2000 
Session, 
2000, p. 2. 
104 Hansard Society, The Challenge for Parliament, cit., pp. 131-133. 
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One of the most contentious issues surrounding select committees is the independence of membership. 
In 2001, when the government attempted to remove two of its most ardent critics from select 
committee chair positions, the House of Commons voted against the motion and the critics were 
reinstated. Current selection procedures are still highly influenced by the party whips and the composition 
of each committee is generally proportionate to the balance of the parties on the floor of 
the House of Commons. The Liaison Committee (2000), the Norton Commission (2000), and the 
Modernisation Committee (2002) all favoured removing powers of selection from the whips. Proposing 
a more independent Committee of Nomination, the proposal of the Modernisation Committee 
was defeated in a 2002 vote in the House of Commons. 
 
Other recommendations for reform have met with more success. Arguably the most important government 
concession to select committee scrutiny has been the Prime Minister's agreement to be 
questioned by the Liaison Committee. Although initially the PM had rejected a 2001 Public Administration 
Committee recommendation to appear before it on a yearly basis to discuss the then 
Government's Annual Report, in April 2002, the PM offered the Liaison Committee a twice yearly 
questioning period of some two to two and a half hours on domestic and international affairs. To 
date, the PM has been questioned on a variety of subjects including the Iraq war. Rogers and Walters 
perceive this as a further executive concession to Parliament that will be difficult for future 
PMs to withdraw from105. 
 
A further advance for the select committee system is the 2003 recommendation to reward departmental 
and most inter-departmental select committee chairs with £12,500 on top of their MPs salaries 
(Review Body on Senior Salaries, 2003). One of the recommendations of the Norton Commission 
was that select committees should offer an alternative career path to that of ministerial office106. 
While not universally popular both inside and outside the House, this move toward variable 
parliamentary salaries is arguably an important first step in any attempt to alter the current imbalances 
in career incentives between the legislative and executive branches. 
Another recent advance for select committees has been the creation and extension of staffing resources 
for the Scrutiny Unit - a body that provides select committees with advice on expenditures 
and draft legislation. This development reflects the recent emphasis that the Modernisation and Liaison 
Committees have placed on supporting a more systematic and less ad hoc approach to the 
exercise of scrutiny. In June 2002, the Liaison Committee established guidance on four objectives 
and ten core tasks for departmental select committees: 
 
Objective A: To examine and comment on the policy of the department. 
Task 1: To examine policy proposals from the UK Government and the European Commission in 
Green Papers, White Papers, draft Guidance etc., and to inquire further where the Committee 
considers 
it appropriate. 
Task 2: To identify and examine areas of emerging policy, or where existing policy is deficient, 
and make proposals. 
Task 3: To conduct scrutiny of any published draft bill within the Committee's responsibilities. 
 
105 Robert Rogers and Rhodri Walters, How Parliament Works, cit., p. 375 
106 Philip Norton, Strengthening Parliament, cit., p. 69. 
 
Task 4: To examine specific output from the department expressed in documents or other 
decisions. 
 
Objective B: To examine the expenditure of the department. 
Task 5: To examine the expenditure plans and out-turn of the department, its agencies and 
principal NDPBs. 
 
Objective C: To examine the administration of the department. 
Task 6: To examine the department's Public Service Agreements, the associated targets and the 
statistical measurements employed, and report if appropriate. 
Task 7: To monitor the work of the department's Executive Agencies, NDPBs, regulators and 
other associated public bodies. 
Task 8: To scrutinise major appointments made by the department. 
Task 9: To examine the implementation of legislation and major policy initiatives. 
 
Objective D: To assist the House in debate and decision. 
Task 10: To produce reports which are suitable for debate in the House, including Westminster 
Hall, or debating committees107. 
However, despite some recent advances (both own initiative and executive concessions), the select 
committee system continues to attract calls for reform, most notably in relation to access to papers and 
people, and on improving committee impact on the work and policies of government108. Key hurdles to 
effective oversight of government departments remain, for example, lack of prime time in Parliament to 
consider major select committee reports, lack of power to require the attendance of ministers and civil 
servants, and lack of power to force them to answer questions. Walters and 
Rogers argue that focus on these lack of powers is unlikely to go away, but that any attempt to address 
them 'would require a fundamental change in the relationship between government and Parliament' 
109. 
Administrative review and oversight by Parliament, although in flux, and with some recent advancements 
for Parliament, remains constrained by the constitutional arrangements, one-party majority 
governments and strong partisanship, that ensure that without fundamental change, the executive 
is invariably able to dominate. 
 
107 Liaison Committee, Annual Report for 2002, HC 558, 2002-2003 Session, 2003, p. 9. 
108 Hansard Society Conference Proposals, The Future of Select Committees: Issues, Challenges, and 
Proposals 
for Reform, Westminster, 2004. 
109 Robert Rogers and Rhodri Walters, How Parliament Works, op. cit., p. 385. 
 
